Can One Be a Moral Relativist and Still Believe in the Existence of Right and Wrong?

Can  One Be a  Moral Relativist and Still Believe in the Existence of Right and Wrong?

How can one reconcile living in a country in which we believe in both absolute forms of right and wrong and yet subscribe to a belief in moral relativism?   How can one person (though not usually in the same breath) proclaim the belief that we all determine our own morality based on internal and external causes and yet condemn someone for failing to live up to certain moral standards.  Does a person not find it hypocritical to try to impose his values on others while claiming that moral judgments are relative?  At first glance, it appears as though we have a disjuncture of beliefs. 

                Yet, before we start making these people wear a crimson H on their chests to mark their hypocritical nature, we must consider the possibility that moral relativism and moral absolutism can possibly be reconciled in to one belief system.  One might be inclined to argue that something cannot both be absolute and relative.  Let us first confront the issue of definitions.  Moral absolutism is the easier starting place, as it seems to be less in dispute over what is intended by the term (though as with all alleged indisputable facts, there are those who would dispute this).  Moral absolutists believe that there is an absolute and incontrovertible existence of things that are right or wrong.  What is less clear is if all actions are able to be labeled as either right or wrong.  It would seem that picking up an empty cup and pretending to drink would not be morally right or wrong.  But something like making false accusations against a friend to benefit your own career would be viewed by most moral absolutists as undeniably wrong. 

                Moral relativists are a little harder to define.  At least three major versions exist.  The descriptive relativists simply state that there is disagreement over what morals should be held as absolute.  The meta-ethical relativist believes that there is no correct system of morality.  Still, meta-ethical relativists believe that while there is no right version of morality, there are versions that are more correct than others.   And finally, normative relativists believe there can be no true moral standards and that we should tolerate all things regardless of our personal beliefs.   According to this belief, one action is as good as another.  To a normative relativist, helping your grandmother take her medicine is no better or worse than poisoning your grandmother to expedite your inheritance (at least in relation to your personal moral choices).

                What quickly becomes evident is that depending on how we use each term (absolutism and relativism), it changes the difficulty level one faces in trying to reconcile the discrepancies between preaching toleration of different moral beliefs and yet holding some things as absolutely right or wrong.  What also become immediately obvious is that most Americans touting a belief in moral relativism are either descriptive or meta-ethical relativists.  To be a normative relativist at the same time as trying to promote moral views would be hypocritical beyond defense. 

                But if we look at descriptive or meta-ethical relativists, one can see how it is possible to plausibly argue that one could still hold certain moral standards as worth defending.  A descriptive relativist might belief that what moral values are correct is up for debate while still believing that they have found some ethical stances upon which a firm footing has been established.  And a meta-ethical relativist might believe that we cannot have one set of moral values that are labeled as the right ones while still believing he has found certain values that can be defended as better than alternative choices.

                So ultimately, it does not appear that there is an inherent hypocrisy underlying the fact that so many Americans are both moral relativists at the same time as taking stances that appear to run parallel to what would be expected from a moral absolutist.   In short, we can allow that our vision of the world is best while accepting that we might be wrong.